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ABSTRACT 
This research considers whether America’s efforts to warn the public of terrorism 
can be improved by utilizing risk communication principles with the Homeland Security 
Advisory System (HSAS), or if not, how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
should handle risk communication in the future. The research proceeds from the 
assumption that the HSAS is irreparably flawed, due to specific public communication 
issues unique to terrorism.  
This research uses a policy analysis method to establish a better understanding of 
the impact and implications of the HSAS on homeland security. Existing literature on this 
subject is either abundant for hazards other than terrorism or minimal and watered down 
when terrorism is grouped with “all-hazards.” Unforeseen future changes in technology, 
politics, and society will require continued review of this subject matter and related 
policy; it is anticipated that this research will help those future efforts. 
There is no evidence that the American public can be provided with more than 
vague and general information regarding threats of terrorism and the specificity required 
by risk communication principles is better used to support prevention efforts. 
Recommendations for future homeland security risk communication policy address the 
formation and sustainment of public resiliency through education. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Terrorism threat advisories, as we know them today, are a result of the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001. The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), a 
color-coded chart of five threat levels, was created and established in 2002 by President 
George W. Bush through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3). The 
HSAS was established to set a wide-ranging and effective way to disseminate to all levels 
of government—authority, the private sector, and to the American people—information 
regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The HSAS is applied directly to the federal 
executive branch and directs all nonmilitary federal agencies to ensure that their 
operations are consistent with the HSAS national threat level and to develop 
corresponding protective measures (Bush, 2002). HSPD-3 encourages voluntary 
conformity from other levels of government and the private sector. Efforts, such as the 
Ready Campaign (United States Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008) and 
National Preparedness Month, try to educate the American public about the HSAS and 
what actions to take when the threat level is elevated. 
Numerous problems with HSAS implementation have been identified by 
stakeholders, Congress, and the media. The most notable recommendation has been to 
integrate into the HSAS risk communication principles (Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 2004, 15), which would presumably facilitate a more effective exchange 
of information about the risk of terrorism. In the absence of such principles—because it 
was built without them—the HSAS has been poorly understood, heavily critiqued, and 
ultimately ineffective in meeting its intended purpose. The consequences have been 
widespread emotional overreaction by the American public and massive financial impacts 
to political subdivisions. These consequences have been confirmed through TOPOFF 
(Top Officials) exercises, Government Accountability Office reports, and summaries 
from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
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According to the principles of risk communication, terrorism threat information 
should be consistent, accurate, and clear; provided repeatedly through multiple methods; 
provided in a timely fashion; specific (nature, timing, location); and provided with 
guidance on protective measures (GAO, 2004). The threat information specifics are 
difficult to obtain because they are dependent upon detection of terrorists and their plots 
through counter-terrorism intelligence. The notion of improving the HSAS through the 
provision of threat specifics while warning the American public, as HSPD-3 requires, 
places the HSAS in conflict with prevention efforts. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can terrorism warnings to the American public be improved by utilizing risk 
communication principles with the HSAS? If not, how should the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security handle risk communication with the American public regarding 
terrorism threats? 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
This research begins with the assumption that the HSAS is flawed, but it proceeds 
from the suspicion that the flaws may be unfixable because the need to employ risk 
communication principles and the challenges that result from such an employment are 
irreconcilable. Some of the problems with the HSAS may in fact be intensified, rather 
than overcome, by traditional risk communication principles because of specific public 
communication issues unique to terrorism. It is anticipated that research will call into 
question the reasoning behind the desire to warn the public about specific threats of 
terrorism. Sustaining a system regardless of its ability to effectively achieve its stated 
purpose with the American public may stem from perceptions of political necessity 
following September 11. The effects of sustaining the system will be explored, and 
findings will frame the recommendations for future HSAS policy.  
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The core documents pertaining to the foundation, mission, design, and functions 
of the HSAS are Homeland Security Presidential Directives 3 (HSPD-3) and 5 (HSPD-5). 
There are also numerous reports from the GAO, CRS, and other sources that have 
criticized various aspects, flaws, and consequences of the system. Public Law 110-53, 
implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (United States 
Congress, 2007b) required changes to the HSAS and resulted in the establishment of a 
bipartisan task force under the Homeland Security Advisory Council. The Homeland 
Security Advisory System Task Force Report and Recommendations review is a first step 
toward implementing the requirements of Public Law 110-53. 
Criticism of the HSAS has resulted in the analysis of technological tools as 
possible solutions to better communication of warnings. The CRS Report for Congress: 
The Emergency Alert System (EAS) and All-Hazard Warnings evaluates the EAS as a 
possible solution to terrorism threat advisories in the future. Executive Order 13407 
(Bush, 2006) requires advancement of the EAS. This executive order tasks the Secretary 
of DHS with enhancing EAS communications to reach cell phones, personal digital 
assistants and text pagers within specific geographic areas and specific groups. This was 
done to ensure that the president can communicate with the American public at all times, 
including during instances of war, terrorism, natural disaster, or other hazards. Executive 
order 13407 led to the IPAWS (Integrated Public Alert and Warning System) initiative 
being coordinated by FEMA, within DHS. 
IPAWS implementation has been challenging, and it has been criticized. U.S. 
congressional hearings have been important in detailing and documenting problems faced 
by FEMA. In a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management (2008a) the 
Honorable James L. Oberstar summarized the challenges to IPAWS as resulting from a 
lack of planning for the future. It was also noted, during a hearing of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and 
Investigations (2008b), that FEMA’s challenges with IPAWS are linked to legacy 
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problems stemming from EAS. A history of different roles between levels of government, 
the public, and private sectors has led to coordination problems and inconsistent 
utilization of EAS within and among states. A Federal Computer Week article, “FEMA 
Adopts Open Standards” (Lipowicz, 2008), emphasizes that IPAWS is not a simple 
technology solution. No single system will work for all jurisdictions, and a meta-systems 
approach requires partnerships with new stakeholders and those from the EAS era.  
What is communicated in a warning is just as important as how it is 
communicated. Understanding about the necessary substance of a message comes from a 
long history of risk communication on natural hazards, technological accidents, and 
missing children. In critiquing the HSAS, the GAO publication “Communication 
Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory 
System” (2004, 15) recommends that risk communication principles be used with the 
HSAS to facilitate the effective exchange of information on the risk of terrorism. 
According to this GAO publication, when these principles are applied to a terrorism 
threat the information should be: consistent, accurate, and clear; provided repeatedly 
through multiple methods; provided in a timely fashion; specific about the threat (nature, 
timing, location); and provided with guidance on protective measures. A Partnership for 
Public Warning publication, “Protecting America’s Communities: An Introduction to 
Public Alert & Warning” (2004), explains that using risk communication principles 
increases the likelihood that recipients of the warning will take protective action. This is a 
challenging process that requires gaining the public’s attention through accurate and 
relevant information that is timely enough for people to react. 
The specificity of shared information and timeliness that these principles require 
is uniquely problematic in the case of terrorism. In the article, “Delivering Clear and 
Effective Warnings: Applying Lessons from Natural Hazards to Terrorism,” Dr. Peter 
Ward (2002), of the Partnership for Public Warning, notes that risk communication 
related to terrorism is unique from other hazards because terrorists can interact with 
warnings. Too much information distributed to the public regarding a terrorism threat can 
aid terrorists in achieving their goal of successful attack. Without specific information, 
however, terrorism warnings become questionable as to their effectiveness and can cause 
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unintended consequences. In an article titled “The Political Psychology of Terrorist 
Alarms,” Dr. Philip Zimbardo (2003) claims that warnings lacking specificity cause fear. 
The article roots terrorism in psychology and points out that terrorism is strategic action 
to incite fear. Vague and false alarms do the work for terrorists, creating heightened and 
sustained anxiety and confusion within the American public.  
These hazard-specific problems call into question the purpose of the HSAS. Dr. 
Batya Ludman in an Israel News Agency article, “Israel Leads in Making Terror 
Warnings Effective” (2004), states that terrorism is fear inducing because the threat lacks 
predictability as to when, where, and how attacks may occur. The efforts of counter-
terrorism intelligence are aimed at finding answers to these questions in order to prevent 
an attack from occurring. HSPD-3 and HSPD-5 are seemingly incongruent with 
prevention efforts if directed toward the American public.  
E. METHOD, OUTPUT, AND GOALS 
The research of this thesis is intended to advance the understanding of terrorism-
related risk communication with the American public. Existing literature on risk 
communication is abundant for hazards other than terrorism. The small amount of 
literature related to terrorism risk communication is either watered down by grouping 
terrorism with “all-hazards” or limiting it to problem identification with the HSAS. This 
research will attempt to merge these two areas of literature and build on them, utilizing 
the tools of policy analysis. Conclusions will be drawn with the understanding that 
unforeseen future changes in technology, politics, and society will require continued 
review of this subject matter and related policy. It is anticipated that this research will 
help those future efforts and decision makers.  
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Following the introduction to research on this topic, Chapter II describes the 
history of terrorism threat advisories in the United States, the HSAS itself, and the related 
problems that have been identified with this system. Chapter III discusses the 
fundamentals of public warnings and their relationship to terrorism and the HSAS. It will 
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provide a broader and more in-depth review of the issues surrounding the communication 
process. Chapter IV concludes the research with a summary analysis of previous chapters 
and discusses aspects of American politics relevant to this topic. Chapter V makes final 
policy recommendations for the United States regarding the HSAS and terrorism risk 
communication to the public. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM THREAT ADVISORIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM 
The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), necessitated by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, was created and established in 2002 by President George 
W. Bush through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3). The HSAS 
(Bush, 2002) was the administration’s answer to an alarmed public that demanded to 
know more about government actions to prevent terrorism. The system was established to 
set a wide-ranging and effective way to disseminate information to all levels of 
government authority, the private sector, and to the American people regarding the risk of 
terrorist attacks. It was designed to establish a common language and method for sharing 
terrorist-threat information and to detail the actions that should be taken in response to 
those threats.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Graphic image of the Homeland Security Advisory System (Source: 
Department of Homeland Security) 
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The HSAS (Bush, 2002) directs all nonmilitary federal agencies to ensure that 
their counter-terrorism operations are consistent with the respective HSAS color-coded 
threat level and to develop corresponding protective measures. HSPD-3 encourages 
voluntary conformity from political subdivisions and the private sector. Efforts, such as 
the Ready Campaign (DHS, 2008) and the September National Preparedness Month, 
have been attempts to educate the American public about the HSAS and the actions to 
take when there is an elevated threat level. 
HSPD-5, issued in 2003, amended HSPD-3 and gave the responsibility for 
designating threat levels through the HSAS to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, which is still the case today. Setting the threat level is done in 
consultation with the U.S. Attorney General (Bush, 2003), other appropriate federal 
agency directors, and members of the President’s Homeland Security Council. In order to 
change the threat level, DHS must understand threat information from a variety of 
sources. DHS receives threat information from multiple sources (GAO, 2004), including 
but not limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and the National Counter-Terrorist Center (NCTC). Threat levels are 
intended to be applied to the entire nation (Bush, 2002), a specific geographic area, or to 
certain industrial sectors. Communicating a change in the threat level has been 
accomplished through electronic notification (Reese, 2008) from the National Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). DHS also makes notification to 
elected and appointed officials and other stakeholders through conference calls, e-mail, or 
electronic communications before the public is notified through a press conference and 
resulting media coverage.  
According to the DHS (2008), since its establishment in March of 2002, the 
HSAS has remained at code yellow—or elevated alert—except for the eight periods in 
which it was raised to code orange, or high alert. There has only been one instance, in 
August 2006, when the HSAS was raised to code red, or severe alert (DHS, 2008), and 
that instance was specific to flights from the United Kingdom to the United States.  
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B.  EXPANDED UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS WITH THE HSAS 
Understanding the challenges that have come from the HSAS requires analysis of 
its real-world application absent a terrorist attack and its simulated application after an 
exercise-scenario-based attack. The latter has generated much discussion and many 
worthwhile recommendations regarding the HSAS. Exercising a national system with 
stakeholders at all levels of government is no small effort and has required Congressional 
action. Reacting to global terrorism, such as the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo subway Sarin gas 
incident, the U.S. Congress determined (Department of State, 2002) that top U.S. 
government officials should be better prepared to address terrorism involving the use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 1998, Congress mandated that the Department 
of State and the Department of Justice conduct a series of full-scale multi-jurisdictional 
exercises involving response to a WMD terrorist attack. The result was the TOPOFF 
(Top Officials) exercise. Beginning with TOPOFF 2000, there have been four TOPOFF 
exercises.  
The TOPOFF exercise series has been the only way to test the process for raising 
the HSAS, communicating threat information, and understanding related impacts to those 
with law enforcement, protective measures, or countermeasure responsibilities. TOPOFF 
2 was the first test of the system; held from May 12 to 16, 2003, it was the largest and 
most extensive terrorism response exercise in U.S. history (DHS, 2003). It tested the 
HSAS with the first-ever elevation to code red, or severe alert. Exercising that elevation 
gave federal agencies their first opportunity to test their response actions and allowed 
participants and evaluators to examine the implications. The same was found for those 
local jurisdictions that raised their own threat levels to red.  
Ultimately, TOPOFF 2 found that modification to HSAS implementation was 
required (DHS, 2003). According to the 2003 TOPOFF 2 After Action Summary Report, 
there was a lack of awareness of local threat advisory systems, inconsistent or nonexistent 




language for communicating elevations. There was also uncertainty among federal 
agencies about the necessary protective actions in response to code red, and there was 
confusion about other agencies’ actions. 
The resulting recommendation was to develop and coordinate responses to HSAS 
elevations among federal agencies and with political subdivisions (DHS, 2003). It was 
suggested by participants that responses be tiered in correlation to the HSAS threat levels 
and be specific to the type of threat. Four years later similar challenges were observed 
during TOPOFF 4 (DHS, 2007). The TOPOFF 4 After Action Quick Look Report 
observed that the HSAS threat levels lacked clarity of purpose, definition, and 
consequences. The resulting recommendation was to review and revise HSAS policy, 
synchronize HSAS with other alerts, and clarify the protective actions necessary for each 
threat level and sector (DHS, 2007). 
Exercises have not been the only source of criticism of the HSAS. Responding to 
government agencies’ questions about the quality of threat information provided by DHS, 
and the costs incurred from responses to changes in the threat level, both the 
Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office have looked closely 
at the HSAS and offered recommendations to Congress for improvement. According to 
the CRS (2008), there are numerous issues associated with HSAS and how it affects 
political subdivisions, the public, and the private sector. These include vagueness of 
warnings; lack of specific protective measures; inadequate dissemination of warnings; 
poor coordination of HSAS with other federal warning systems;1 and the cost of threat-
level changes. On the other hand, GAO (2004) examined the decision-making process for 
changing the threat level; the application of risk-communication principles to information 
sharing within government; protective measures used during code orange, or high alert 
periods; and the costs associated with those periods. The Government Accountability 
Office (2004, 15) recommended that risk-communication principles that are employed 
with other hazards, such as bad weather, be used with the HSAS to facilitate the effective 
                                                 
1 Other federal warning systems include Department of Defense (DoD) use of the Force Protection 
Condition (FPCON) and U.S. Coast Guard use of the Maritime Security Threat System (MARSEC). 
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exchange of information on the risk of terrorism. This is the single most important 
finding and recommendation. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the key points of criticism and 
recommendations, respectively.  
 
Table 1.   Summary of Criticisms of the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSAS) (Source: Congressional Research Service, General Accounting 
Office). 
1 There is a lack of awareness of local advisories in relation to the HSAS. This suggests a 
lack of buy-in from stakeholders and limits the HSAS scope to the federal government. 
2 There are insufficient notification protocols for elevations in the HSAS threat levels. There 
is a related lack of common language to communicate elevations. 
3 There is uncertainty regarding necessary protective measures required during elevations. 
4 The HSAS threat levels lack clarity of purpose, definition, and consequences. 
5 There is poor coordination of HSAS with other federal warning systems. 
6 There are high costs associated with elevation in HSAS threat levels. 
7 There is a lack of risk-communication principles and documented communication protocol. 
 
Table 2.   Summary of Recommended Changes to the Homeland Security 
Advisory System (HSAS) (Source: Congressional Research Service, General 
Accounting Office). 
1 Develop coordinated responses to elevations by using a tiered operational response 
framework. 
2 Synchronize the HSAS with other systems or consolidate all federal warning systems. 
3 Clarify necessary protective actions by level and sector. 
4 Use specificity in elevations of the HSAS threat advisories. 
5 Limit the scope of the HSAS to federal agencies. 
6 Have DHS develop protective action guidance for political subdivisions, the private 
sector, and the public. 
7 Use technology to better disseminate HSAS threat advisories. 
8 Allow existing homeland security grants to states and localities to address costs associated 
with HSAS elevations or establish new and specific HSAS grants for this purpose. 
9 Document HSAS communication protocols. 
10 Incorporate risk-communication principles into the HSAS. 
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Criticism of the HSAS, and recommendations for change, have driven attempts at 
legislated improvement. The 108th 2 and the 109th 3 Congresses have previously proposed 
several bills to modify or replace the HSAS, but none was ever successfully enacted. It 
was not until the 110th Congress and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 (United States Congress, 2007b) that change to the HSAS was 
legislated. That law requires the DHS Secretary to administer the HSAS in a manner that 
warns government of domestic terrorism threats, and the American public as appropriate. 
Specifically, it requires the Secretary to establish criteria for the issuance and revocation 
of advisories; develop a methodology for issuance and revocation; provide specific 
information and advice on protective measures; limit the scope of advisories to specific 
regions, localities, or sectors; and refrain from using color designations exclusively to 
specify threat levels. These legislated changes were not novel and are consistent with 
previous recommendations for change. Still, apart from the few minor adjustments in 
sector specific application by DHS in 2006, the HSAS has been relatively unchanged 
since the enactment of Public Law 110-53. The HSAS threat levels have not been 
adjusted, elevated, or lowered since that time. 
On July 14, 2009, President Barack Obama’s newly appointed DHS Secretary, 
Janet Napolitano, ordered a sixty-day review of the HSAS and its effectiveness in 
warning Americans of terror threats and providing them with information on related 
protective measures (McCarter, 2009). The review was under the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council’s bipartisan task force, chaired by Fran Townsend and Judge William 
Webster. Membership included elected officials, law enforcement, and private-sector 
security experts. The task force review is a first step in implementing the requirements of 
Public Law 110-53. During the review, the task force accepted input from the public and 
subject matter experts such as former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge. In September 2009, the 
Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report and Recommendations was 
published. 
                                                 
2 From the 108th Congress: House Bill 3266; Senate bill 118; and House Bill 2537. 
3 From the 109th Congress: House Bill 2101; Senate Bill 1753; and House Bill 5001. 
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The report was summarized into six main points. These points affirmed the need 
for the HSAS, noting its continued relevance to homeland security efforts. The report 
stated the need for the HSAS to remain dedicated to terrorism and not to become aligned 
with other national warning systems. It acknowledged that the HSAS has an audience in 
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the American public. It confirmed that 
communication with the public has been poor, causing a lack of confidence in the system 
that must be fixed. It also noted the need for the HSAS to be reset to a new default 
baseline guarded status. The report explained the need for specific warnings and 
protective measures applicable to threatened localities, first responders, and private-
sector companies. Lastly, it claimed that the Secretary needs dedicated HSAS resources, 
staff, protocols, and procedures. 
The report’s recommendations focused on the six summarized points and were 
divided into five categories: threshold conclusions; recommendations for the whole 
system; recommendations specific to the general public; recommendations specific to 
institutional players; and infrastructure for the future. The twenty recommendations are 







Table 3.   HSAS Task Force Report Recommendations for the Secretary 
(Source: Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report and 
Recommendations). 
Threshold Conclusions 
1 Remain exclusively focused on terrorism 
2 Four identified vulnerabilities with the current system 
Recommendations for the Whole System 
3 Provide the fullest degree of information possible, declassify, and disclose 
4 Secretary’s communication should be ongoing, regular, and coordinated with states and 
localities 
5 Develop a common vocabulary for threat levels across the federal government 
6 Offer transparency on the process used to make alert decisions 
7 Set a new guarded baseline for the system 
8 Target threat alerts to specific locations and sectors at risk 
9 Regularly reassess the system and lower threat levels when threat information permits 
10 Secretary should debrief threats and what has happened to them 
Recommendations Specific to the General Public 
11 Retain targeted risk communication with the public 
12 Reduce the system to three levels 
13 Do not substitute threat levels for full disclosure of information 
14 Stay current with new media and ways to communicate 
Recommendations Specific to Institutional Players 
15 Target threat alerts to specific locations and sectors at risk and revisit decision merits 
every 15 days 
16 Convey the same message meaning for both the public and institutional players 
17 Develop a plan and protocol for reaching institutional players 
18 Secretary should review DHS capability to communicate sophisticated and technical 
information 
19 Utilize fusion centers and JTTFs as point of contact for state information 
Infrastructure for the Future 
20 Strengthen the system with dedicated resources, staff, protocols, and procedures 
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III. CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC WARNINGS 
A. BACKGROUND AND MECHANISM OF PUBLIC WARNINGS 
Warning is a seemingly simple term to understand. When a warning is given, it is 
an attempt to notify a person or group about a threat in advance of harm. A warning 
should include an instruction to either do something, or not, which will ultimately help 
protect the recipient or help counter the threat. A historical example of this in America is 
the 1775 Paul Revere ride from Boston to Lexington to warn people of British Army 
troop movements. In this example, Paul Revere was a credible messenger delivering a 
clear and specific warning that motivated people to action and resulted in the defeat of 
the British at Concord (Zimbardo, 2003). Contextually, this example of warning is 
straightforward. However, substituting terrorists for the British and the American public 
for the militia, it becomes clear that warning about the threat of terrorism is not similar to 
the Paul Revere warning. Granted, both are related to preserving life from violent attack, 
but the threat and target of attack are different, which has a significant impact on the 
warning message. Terrorism is specific to clandestine threats, which makes it hard to 
achieve clear and specific message content. Terrorism also targets more than military 
forces, which makes the effectiveness of the message more difficult because of the 
variance and complexity of the audience. It is the intentional predation on noncombatant 
civilians using the element of surprise that sets terrorism apart from other threats. These 
elements challenge the notion of effective warning and warrant contemplation in relation 
to message content.  
The warning act itself is clear-cut. It is intrinsic human behavior meant for 
survival. One can see it in its most basic form with alarm calls (Weiss, 2005) and SOS 
screams that primates use as a pure life-saving strategy against predators (Zuberbuhler, 
2007). Humans have retained this same innate anti-predation behavior throughout 
evolution (Treves & Palmqvist, 2007). This built-in warning behavior was even present 
on September 11, 2001. The onboard activity of United Airlines Flight 93 after the plane 
was hijacked on the morning of 9/11 shows that passengers used GTE air phones and 
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cellular phones to contact authorities, relatives, and friends (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [National Commission], 2004). Through these 
calls, the passengers became aware of the other planes that had been flown into the World 
Trade Center. Through social networking, passengers were warned of the terrorism 
threat. The instinctual “alarm calls” gave information that resulted in action from a few of 
the passengers against the hijacking terrorists. This ultimately led to Flight 93 not 
reaching its intended target—the White House or U.S. Capitol—and instead crash 
landing in a Shanksville, Pennsylvania, field, killing all on board, including the terrorists 
(National Commission, 2004). The Flight 93 example of warning illustrates our human 
conditioning to tell others about danger and to be receptive to such warnings. 
Unfortunately, Flight 93 warnings did not result in survival for those who received it. The 
warnings came too late. 
What HSPD-3 directs the United States to provide to citizens is information akin 
to the Flight 93 warnings, albeit earlier and with more confidence. This is significantly 
more complex than warning from person to person. National-level warnings are a more 
complicated social process than interpersonal communication (Smelser, 2007). The 
former messages must be received and understood by a diverse society in order to 
influence behavior. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why risk-communication 
principles have been recommended for warnings from the HSAS. Risk communication is 
well researched and studied in the context of natural and technological hazards. Testing 
and applying risk communication over time has led to an understanding that empowering 
people to make informed safety decisions is easier when necessary and specific 
information is provided (Partnership for Public Warning, 2004). In essence, the 
application of these principles to terrorism is an attempt to provide the public with 
specifics on the threat to improve the likelihood that protective action will be taken. 
When this has not been the case with HSAS warnings, there is evidence of significant 
consequences. The most notable of these is widespread emotional overreactions and 
massive financial impacts. A nationwide survey (United States Conference of Mayors, 
2003) showed that cities spent about $70 million per week in orange-alert-related direct 
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expenses.4 These unbudgeted expenditures could not be sustained (Reese, 2008) and did 
not provide the security that was intended. Vague warnings have also been shown to 
incite fear in the public (Zimbardo, 2003). By creating heightened and sustained anxiety 
and confusion among the American public, unspecific warnings spread fear the way 
terrorists do (Zimbardo, 2003). 
Criticism supported with factual data did bring about change in HSAS 
application. The best example of the attempt to improve message effectiveness is the 
August 2006 HSAS elevation to code orange for commercial aviation coming to the 
United States and to code red for flights originating from the United Kingdom (United 
States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2008b). The elevation was the direct 
result of a disrupted terrorist plot to bomb aircraft destined for the United States from the 
United Kingdom using liquid explosives. This identification of threat, tactic, and 
vulnerability was used to provide a specific threat advisory and has resulted in the 3-1-1 
liquid carry on policy (3 oz. or less, 1 quart-size bag, 1 bag per passenger) enforced by 
the Transportation Security Administration (Transportation Security Administration 
[TSA], 2009). Specificity enabled preventive measures and protective actions to be 
tailored to the threat and vulnerability. This action was taken without unnecessarily 
impacting other stakeholders or sectors. On the surface, these changes appear to be a 
successful application of the recommended risk-communication principles. Clearly, the 
HSAS can be implemented with the provision of threat specifics. However, the specifics 
must be provided in a timely manner in order for those who are threatened to take 
protective action. The August 2006 advisory was reactionary and did not allow for this. It 
came after the threat had passed, when the plot was already disrupted and the adversaries 
had been interdicted. It did not demonstrate that it could have provided threat specifics 
without that information aiding the terrorists behind the threat. If the warning did provide 
these details before detection and disruption, it would have been widely distributed 
through the media to a broad public audience that included the terrorists. Advising 
adversaries that there were going to be enhanced security measures at airports concerning 
                                                 
4 According to the survey, Phoenix spent $154,000 on a weekly basis, Los Angeles spent $2.5 million 
each week, and New York City spent $5 million each week. 
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liquids would have afforded them an opportunity to modify attack planning, better evade 
law enforcement, and increase the potential for a successful attack.5 
Unfortunately, this example represents the last change in the HSAS threat level 
before the Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report and 
Recommendations was published.6 It has sat unchanged for over three years. Being 
stagnant shows not only that the 2006 change in HSAS application was not a solution, but 
also, that there remain inherent problems with messages regarding terrorism. It is not 
intended to be a general health awareness campaign like those used by the government to 
warn of the dangers associated with drinking and driving, unprotected sex, or the use of 
tobacco products. This type of terrorism awareness is already available, such as from the 
previously mentioned Ready Campaign and National Preparedness Month (USDHS, 
2008c). HSAS warning messages must include information about terrorists and their plots 
in order to increase the chance that those messages will aid in survival. This is not 
straightforward like warning instinctually or about an approaching hurricane. The 
warning message is problematic for counterterrorism prevention efforts, if it discloses 
intelligence-based details to the public. It is counterproductive and dangerous to 
communicate risk in a manner that enables our adversaries or serves their objectives. 
B. MESSAGE DELIVERY: TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY 
The August 2006 warning is also useful in understanding that, due to the delay in 
issuance of the warning, the American public would have been unaware that they were 
potential victims of an attack had the terrorist plot not been disrupted. Prevention of the 
terror attack fortunately also prevented this warning problem. This will not always be the 
case. Future prevention is not guaranteed and may unfortunately bring other attacks like 
that of 9/11. If it is U.S. policy to reach vulnerable people with a warning message when 
                                                 
5 None of the recommendations proposed in the September 2009 Homeland Security Advisory System 
Task Force Report place counterterrorism intelligence for prevention above risk communication with the 
public. Not distinguishing between these audiences, while also recommending increased transparency in 
issuance decision making and increased specificity in warning content does not alleviate the problem of 
informing and aiding terrorists. 
6 The attempt to bomb and destroy Northwest Airlines flight #253 on Christmas Day 2009 on its way 
to Detroit from Amsterdam did not result in any change to the HSAS.  
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these times come, the way and means in which this will be achieved must be determined. 
Clearly, the message must reach the right people with accurate and relevant information 
regardless of time, location, or special needs that the recipient might have (Covello, 
McCallum, & Pavlova, 2004). In the 2006 example, there was no specific identified 
threatened population and no way of exclusively warning them if they had been. In order 
to be effective, future terror warnings must address whom to warn and how to warn them, 
without disclosing intelligence at the expense of law enforcement. This means sharing 
detailed threat information in a timely manner using fail-proof communication with only 
those who are threatened. This would fit the targeted risk communication with the public 
recommended in the Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report and 
Recommendations. The big question is how this is to be done.7 You cannot warn 
someone if you cannot communicate with him.  
Reaching those who are threatened depends on available technology. In the past, 
the medium was ultimately the HSAS messenger. There was no standardized or personal 
way for government to communicate warnings. Various competing media outlets would 
broadcast varied messages based upon the facts they received from DHS or other 
officials. Technology use was relegated to those who chose to listen or view what the 
media had to say on the matter. This has not been the case for other government efforts to 
communicate with the public about other hazards. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) 
has been the historical standard for government risk communication. The EAS is a 
federally managed warning system (L. K. Moore, 2009) administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). It is administered as an all-hazard warning capability in cooperation with the 
National Weather Service (NWS) and is broadcast on National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) weather radios (L. K. Moore, 2009). The FCC (2008) requires 
that all radio and television stations have EAS capability. It is generally understood that 
EAS messages interrupt programming on radio and television to provide short and 
specific information regarding an emergency situation. When EAS began to be used with 
                                                 
7 According to the Partnership for Public Warning (2004), details such as this should be conveyed to 
the public for management of expectations. Public education helps clarify how people will be warned and 
what the warnings mean. 
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the AMBER Alert System (National Center for Missing & Exploited Children [NCMEC], 
2008), it also allowed for specific information to be provided about perpetrators and 
vehicles, which can be broadcast on electronic highway billboards. This capability has 
been incorporated into discussions about how to fix the HSAS.  
In June 2006, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13407, which 
requires expansion of the EAS. This executive order tasks the secretary of DHS with 
enhancing EAS communications to reach cell phones, personal digital assistants, and text 
pagers within specific geographic areas and specific groups. This was done to ensure that 
the president can communicate with the American public at all times, including during 
instances of war, terrorism, natural disaster, or other hazards. This has led to the IPAWS 
(Integrated Public Alert and Warning System) initiative being coordinated by FEMA. 
According to FEMA (2008), IPAWS is the next generation in public warning. FEMA’s 
IPAWS Program Management Office was established to take the vision that was set out 
in President Bush’s 2006 executive order and oversee the evolution from EAS technology 
to more personal and modern forms. Warnings, once limited to media broadcasts through 
television and radio, are intended to be communicated in a personalized manner to all 
Americans in the near future, including languages other than English and to those with 
hearing and vision disabilities. Table 4 is a conceptual comparison between HSAS and 
IPAWS based upon three key related risk communication principles. 
As FEMA puts it, IPAWS will improve terrorism threat advisories by 
communicating with as many people as possible through as many communication devices 
as possible. To accomplish this, FEMA intends to pull several capabilities together into a 
metasystem. Current progress towards this end is found in FEMA pilot programs 
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operating in fourteen states throughout America.8 These pilots are a window to the future 
of the IPAWS metasystem. The Washington Post reports (Hsu, 2006) that these pilot 
programs were initially supported by $25 million in appropriated funds from Congress. 
Initial sustainment funding was provided for IPAWS in the DHS 2009 appropriations. 
There is no sign that this will cease in future fiscal years. Legislature has shown a 
continued interest through requirement of a conversion plan from DHS and related 
reporting.  
Table 4.   Comparison of HSAS and IPAWS Communication Technologies 
Using Risk Communication Principles (Source: Department of Homeland 
Security, FEMA). 
Risk Communication Principles – 
Terrorism Hazard 
Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS) 
Integrated Public Alert & 
Warning System (IPAWS) 
1) Consistent, Accurate, 
and Clear Messaging 
System, intended for federal 
government application, lacked 
policy for communicating risk 
with the American public. 
Intended to communicate risk 
with the American public via 
personal communication 
technology devices. 
2) Repeated Messages 
through Multiple 
Methods 
Communication with the public 
through the media.  
Communication capabilities of 
EAS are greater than general 
press releases. IPAWS potential 
to greatly expand capabilities via 
cell phones, pagers, PDAs, email. 
 
3) Timeliness Limited capability due to reliance 
on media for message 
dissemination. 
Probability of reaching an 
intended audience increases with 
enhanced capability to reach the 
American public via personal 
communication technology 
devices. 
Other notable events surrounding IPAWS originate from the WARN Act 
(Warning, Alert and Response Network Act, P.L. 109-347) and the FCC. According to 
                                                 
8 According to FEMA, some notable pilot projects include Digital EAS (DEAS), a digital technology 
and international warning standards upgrade to overcome the challenges of digital television. The DEAS 
initiative is also piloting DEAS in state and territory emergency operation centers to provide alert capability 
to local officials. The Geo-Targeted Alerting System (GTAS) is a joint project with NOAA through which 
new technologies are being tested to give emergency managers the ability to predict hazard areas, 
collaborate, and deliver alerts and protective measure guidance to specific geographical areas. The Web 
Alert Relay Network (WARN) provides emergency operation centers with web-based collaboration tools 
and alert capabilities. The alert capabilities allow for opt-in participants to receive messages on their cell 
phones and pagers. The Emergency Telephone Notification (ETN) provides automated telephone calling to 
specific geographical areas. Enhanced ETN adds the capability for translation of English into multiple other 
languages. The Deaf and Hard of Hearing Notification System (DHNS) is emergency communication to the 
hearing impaired through American Sign Language videos, the Internet, and other personal communication 
devices. 
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the U.S. House of Representatives (2008) summary on the IPAWS subject, the WARN 
Act required the FCC to establish the Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory 
Committee (CMSAAC). The CMSAAC exists to give the FCC recommendations on 
matters relating to the transmission of emergency alerts by commercial mobile-service 
providers. The result of CMSAAC efforts and FCC adoption of recommendations is the 
nationwide Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS). The CMAS will transmit 
emergency alerts to cellular subscribers through commercial mobile-service providers 
who receive the alert from FEMA, the federal agency aggregator. FEMA has also 
adopted FCC guidance to use open standard technology, CAP (Common Alerting 
Protocol), for message dissemination. CAP is a nonproprietary digital message format 
(Czarnecki, 2008). CAP is capable of sending more than EAS messaging, including 
video, multiple languages, graphics, and resources for those with communication 
disabilities.9 The open system affords an opportunity to bring many private-sector 
companies into partnership such as cable, telecommunication, software, device 
manufacturers, media outlets, and IP-based systems. Assurance of interoperability is 
being addressed through coordination with the National Institute of Standards & 
Technology. 
Not unexpectedly, the activity surrounding the implementation of IPAWS has 
generated critics and disbelievers. In a statement before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and 
Emergency Management (2008a) Congressman Oberstar summarized the challenges to 
IPAWS as having been born of a lack of planning for the future. There is no clear and 
agreed-upon vision for what the future system-of-systems will look like. To date, FEMA 
has invested too much in vendors and contractors and not enough on involving the 
necessary partners and stakeholders (Lipowicz, 2008). The potential effects of this are 
great. The IPAWS solution is not one of technology alone as there is no single 
technology or system that works for all local jurisdictions. To be a true system-of-
systems, partnerships must be cultivated and maintained. This applies to the future as 
                                                 
9 Currently CAP is being used in the DEAS initiative and is interoperable with tools capable of 
receiving CAP 1.1 messages and sending alerts via satellite radio, cell phones, pagers, computers, and 
electronic signs (Stine, 2008). 
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well as to the past. A significant number of partners from the EAS era need to be brought 
along into IPAWS, partners such as broadcasters, who continue to be capable of reaching 
many people in a short period of time (Stine, 2008). FEMA’s rollout of IPAWS is also 
challenged (U.S. House, 2008) because in the past the organization has had issues with 
effective alert dissemination and EAS. A history of different roles between levels of 
government, the public, and private sectors has led to coordination problems and varying 
utilization of EAS within states. Next generation EAS, IPAWS, will be contingent upon 
mending this problem and garnering buy-in from states and localities (Stine, 2008).10 
This is not easily accomplished; however, as it is not yet clear whether FEMA is going to 
scale IPAWS to localized emergencies (Lipowicz, 2008). The lack of buy-in and progress 
from FEMA has led some states and localities to proceed with alert-system infrastructure 
that is not compatible with CAP (Sternstein, 2009). If FEMA does scale IPAWS to 
localized emergencies, there will be greater potential for local infrastructure to be built 
with CAP compatibility. It is unclear whether the existing incompatible infrastructure 
challenge can be overcome. There has been mention that state organization around this 
issue, such as establishment of State Emergency Communications Committees (SECC), 
may be capable of building new distribution networks for CAP alerts (Lipowicz, 2008). 
This, however, has not moved beyond conceptual conversation. Any effort to address 
incompatible infrastructure would require significant funding that has not yet been 
estimated. There are also other financial implications associated with a localized IPAWS, 
such as the considerable training needed to originate effective CAP messages. In 2007, 
GAO found that EAS was mired in dependability and effectiveness issues because many 
EAS participants nationwide lacked the training and technical skills necessary to issue 
alerts. 
                                                 
10 Challenges and shortcomings may be addressed through future legislation. From the 111th Congress, 
H.R. 2591: The Integrated Public Alert and Warning System Modernization Act of 2009 proposes criteria 
for performance and implementation based upon best practices from the emergency and response 
community (L. K. Moore, 2009). It would authorize $37 million initially and subsequent fiscal year funding 
to support pilot programs. It would establish the IPAWS Advisory Committee, which would oversee the 
IPAWS design and implementation. Specifically, the committee would ensure that IPAWS demonstrated 
system requirements included in the bill. IPAWS is to incorporate multiple technologies, communicate 
directly with the public, provide alerts widely, and be redundant. IPAWS is also required to promote 
public-private partnerships for enhanced community preparedness and response. The bill does not, 
however, require IPAWS to coordinate with the similar work and efforts being undertaken by states and 
localities. 
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Ultimately, the reality that IPAWS will meet the vision set by Executive Order 
13407 is science fiction at present, and progress is mired in significant challenges. This 
unfortunate reality is disruptive to the notion of providing timely information to those 
who are imminently threatened by an unavoidable terrorist attack. IPAWS does not 
currently allow for the information necessary to save lives to reach people in a personal 
manner. Even if those with responsibility for detecting terrorists and their plots had 
information to share with specific threatened populations, they are unable to do so. 
Changing this and improving efficiency is unlikely as long as the IPAWS initiative is a 
system-of-systems approach by FEMA that is not effectively coordinated with necessary 
stakeholders.  
C. THE MESSENGER RECEIVER RELATIONSHIP: POWER OF 
PERCEPTION 
As usual, what we were doing was fodder for criticism, and for satire. 
— Tom Ridge 
The messenger of a warning is an important determinant of its effectiveness, and 
the wrong approach can cause even the best message to be ineffective. Success is 
measured by the actions taken by the public in response to a warning, and this hinges on 
established credibility and trust of the messenger (Parker, 2005). Being understood as a 
credible and trustworthy messenger by the receiver is important to message recognition 
(Pinker, 2007). Trust can be defined as the mental intention to be vulnerable and accept 
information based upon positive expectations of intentions and behavior of the messenger 
(Banerjee, Bowie, & Pavone, 2006). Establishing this is necessary for someone to receive 
and act on shared information (Banerjee, Bowie, & Pavone, 2006). It can take time to 
develop and is dependent upon positive past experiences and positive perceptions 
(Banerjee, Bowie, & Pavone, 2006). This is central to understanding why some 
individuals and organizations are able to share information with positive results. It is 
believed that how one perceives the messenger is pivotal to effectiveness and determines 
what action will or will not be taken (Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials, 2002). There are at least twenty perceptual factors that have been shown to 
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influence people’s willingness to accept information and assess risk (Jones-Hard, 2004). 
All of these have relevance to how people perceive the HSAS and terror warnings.11 To 
accept this type of information, people want to know and understand that the messenger 
has these traits. This can help explain why it is still very challenging to incite the 
American public to protect itself and why some people do not heed hazard warnings. 
Perceptions can even negate reception of information about the most significant risks 
(Covello, 1998). Information about terrorism, which can rate high with the public, is still 
challenged by the complexity of people’s perceptions of the messenger (Jones-Hard, 
2004).  
Messengers must also contend with the nature of terrorism and how it is 
personally experienced by those being communicated with. The emotional state of the 
recipient helps determine whether or not he will receive, accept, and act on the message 
being sent. In the case of terrorism, it is fear that is of most concern for messengers. It has 
been shown that people are less likely to be receptive to information when it is provided 
during a crisis (Covello, 1998). The emotional involvement of the message recipient and 
his feeling of being personally threatened can generate mental noise, an inability to 
comprehend, which can inhibit one’s ability to engage in communication about personal 
safety (Covello, 1998). Research has shown that up to eighty percent of efficiency and 
effectiveness in processing information is lost in these situations (Covello, 1998).12 The 
high emotional significance of terrorism can also work against trust formation. Those 
who are anxious, fearful, or upset are prone to distrust because they have a harder time 
hearing, understanding, and remembering (Covello, 1998).  
While fear has been claimed to be an emotional motivator13 with other hazards, 
capable of overcoming perception and reception difficulties, this is not the case with 
                                                 
11 The message influence model, which states that the message sent is what counts, is flawed. 
Listeners create meaning to messages based upon perception factors. What results will most likely not be 
identical to the messenger’s intent. The receiver and the message he receives is what counts (Corman, 
Goodall, & Trethewey, 2007). 
12 This loss is even greater when information is provided electronically (Covello, 1998). 
13 It has been suggested that fear-inducing communication can motivate people to take fear-reducing 
action (Boer & Seydel, 1996). If given advice on ways to reduce the threat and remain safe, people are 
believed to be more likely to comply based upon their experienced fear. 
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terrorism (Boer & Seydel, 1996). Terrorists take advantage of and benefit from public 
fear, regardless of whether it is created by an attack or the threat of one. It is common for 
people to be afraid of what they do not understand or are unfamiliar with (Winters, 
2002).14 Even that which is nonthreatening can cause fear if it is unknown. This is why 
people tend to fear terrorism more than other hazards (Ripley, 2008). It also explains why 
the relationship between the nature of the threat and characteristics of the hazard are 
problematic for warning messengers. Warning someone of the likelihood of his death at 
the hands of terrorists can create the same fear and associated adverse reactions (Ripley, 
2008). Messengers who rely on press and news outlets to communicate must also be 
wary. The American media,15 while chasing viewership and ratings, has become known 
to researchers as a partner of terrorists by repeatedly spreading negative messages and 
images to the public since 9/11 (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). Negativity bias drives 
coverage of negative events because our attention and memory is programmed in our 
brains to prioritize negative and high-arousal stimuli (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). 
The effects of this are not easily overcome or forgotten. Emotion memory, heuristics,16 
and its implications on behavior are all working against the messenger’s efforts. The 
result can be an unmotivated and fearful public, prone to denial of threat information and 
avoidance of the messaging (Covello, McCallum, & Pavlova, 2004). Messenger efforts 
must understand that hearing, comprehending, and remembering are better achieved 
through efforts to reduce fear and enhance safety rather than inducing it (Partnership for 
Public Warning, 2004). 
                                                 
14 Winters’s example of the problem with fearing the unknown is the murder of Balbir Singh Sodhi on 
September 15, 2001, in Mesa, Arizona. Mr. Sodhi was murdered because of the turban he wore and the 
color of his skin, despite not being Arab, Muslim, or a terrorist.  
15 The media should be seen as being made up of community representatives no different from others 
that new U.S. policy and strategy should be geared towards. The same holds true for the politicians 
necessary for policy change. The audience that government appeals to for future education on the nature of 
terrorism should be all inclusive.  
16 Perceptions, personal beliefs, are shaped by past emotion-laden experiences (Ripley, 2008). 
Emotions such as fear are used as information by the brain in order to determine what course of action to 
take (Breckenridge, 2010). This is done without intentional thought (Breckenridge, 2010). The brain calls 
upon emotional memory shortcuts to influence intuitive subconscious assessments of risk and decision 
making (Kahneman, 1979). It is only after the fact that we are able to justify for ourselves why we acted the 
way we did (Breckenridge, 2010).  
 27
Regrettably, the circumstances are stacked against government. Thus, much of the 
research into understanding America’s experience with public risk communication 
difficulties has focused on mistrust of government. Americans for the most part consider 
government to be a less credible source of information during a crisis when there is a lack 
of trust. A 2004 Gallup Poll (Parker, 2005) showed that 31 percent of Americans had 
little or no trust in their local government, 32 percent said the same of state government, 
and 41 percent said the same of the federal government. This followed previous 2003 
Gallup Poll findings (D. Moore, 2003), which showed that most Americans were not 
taking steps to prepare for terrorism despite HSAS alerts.17 Only four out of ten 
respondents in that poll believed that HSAS alerts were serious and applied to them. This 
lack of trust in government stems from negative past experiences and public perceptions 
of DHS and the HSAS. This can be attributed to leadership, their qualities, and individual 
behavior (Dirks, 2006). Leaders face great scrutiny in the decisions they make and their 
communications about terrorism. They are judged more severely with matters of safety. 
The public’s concerns about life and death have great bearing on homeland security 
leaders’ ability to communicate terrorism risk through the HSAS. Greater scrutiny of 
their actions increases the likelihood that expectations will not be met. Because of this, it 
                                                 
17 Some reasons offered included the government being unwilling to recognize problems, share 
information, and allow public participation. The public also perceives the government as being insensitive 
to concerns and deficient in carrying out safety responsibilities (Moore, 2003). 
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is harder in this arena to obtain trust (Kramer, 2006)18 and even harder to mend broken 
trust relationships (Banerjee, Bowie, & Pavone, 2006),19 which may exist from past 
application of the HSAS.  
Uncongenial approaches that are distant from the public and layered with 
government formality only exacerbate the problem that homeland security leaders face in 
public communication. As seen with the history of the HSAS, top-down messaging from 
the federal government to individuals regarding terrorism is not the most effective way to 
communicate because the necessary traits for trust determination are hard to assess when 
there is little or no personal familiarity with the messenger (Banerjee, Bowie, & Pavone, 
2006). It is believed that trust is better established from local government approaches to 
addressing the public (Partnership for Public Warning, 2004). Not only are local 
jurisdictions the first to experience an impact and ultimately left to recover, they are also 
represented by people who share in the community’s experience. This aids positive 
perception. The traits that determine trust are found more readily when the messenger is 
close to home, like a local government official. Terrorist attacks, despite being a unique 
man-made hazard with national implications, are no different in the sense that they begin 
and end locally. It is logical, then, to assume that the best messenger of a terrorist threat 
warning would also be a local government leader with responsibility for the threatened 
jurisdiction.  
                                                 
18 As an example, physician and patient relationships demonstrate the significance of scrutiny and life 
preservation on trustworthiness. The dynamic between the physician messenger and patient receiver is 
significant for trusting the communicated message and taking appropriate action directly related to health 
and well-being. Thus, as patient scrutiny of behavior increases so does the likelihood that negative 
judgments will be made about the trustworthiness of the physician. It is less likely in this setting that 
appropriate action will be taken for one’s own health. Further, this physician-patient relationship has been 
shown to be significantly impacted by managed care settings (Kramer, 2006). The trust in communication 
that results in action is significantly diminished in team medical settings with institutional practices and 
policy. The trust that can be envisioned as resulting from a home visiting family physician is lost in 
institutionalized settings. Perceptions that form trust are not only challenged due to the scrutiny placed on 
behavior related to health and safety, they are also limited when a person is faced with more people, 
bureaucracy, and complex impersonal processes. 
19 If trust is damaged it is not easily recovered and requires different approaches than gaining it to 
begin with. The mistrusting must reestablish expectations and overcome negative perceptions associated 
with the event that damaged the trust. The trust attempting to be reacquired can be significantly greater than 
that which was initially developed (Banerjee, Bowie, & Pavone, 2006). 
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Taking into account the content requirements for an effective message, the notion 
of local terror warning implies that there is an intelligence capability to support the 
messenger. If public warning were to occur locally, state and local fusion centers and 
capabilities would have to be considered as a way of making that possible. Fusion centers 
in concept are intended to counter top-down approaches to prevention by fusing together 
different disciplines, levels of government, and in certain instances the FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). It is claimed that information can be collected and 
analyzed locally, shared at the national level for big picture analysis, and returned to the 
local level to continue the intelligence cycle and aid in prevention (Osborne, 2009). 
Incorporating local law enforcement into the intelligence community could be 
advantageous because it would put boots on the ground in communities across the nation 
(Bettenhausen, 2008). This capability is unique to local government and is claimed to 
enable local and state law enforcement to better detect future terror plots (Squires, 2009). 
Colocation within fusion centers is intended to aid in successfully overcoming the 
complexity inherent in this type of government collaboration and in achieving the desired 
homogeneous effort towards prevention. 
Still, these advantageous qualities are not aimed at risk communication. The 
fusion center philosophy remains one of prevention, to uniquely investigate, collect, and 
analyze intelligence to enhance counterterrorism efforts (Nenneman, 2008). 
Consideration of adding the duty of publicly warning is significant and unprecedented. 
Doing so puts nonprevention-based objectives in competition with resources dedicated to 
counterterrorism’s greatest priority. Still, warning the public over private networks and 
systems has been encouraged by the federal government (Department of Justice, 2005).20 
This is a complex proposition requiring much more than just creating new private-sector 
partnerships for access to functioning communication infrastructure. To get to this 
hypothesized end state for the nation with fusion centers, the whole of state and local law 
enforcement would need to adopt not just public warning but also counterterrorism as an 
organizational mission. Those efforts would also need to be resourced and fully 
                                                 
20 DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines (2005) note that fusion centers should create a seamless 
communication environment and specifically recommend consideration of CAP utilization to enable public 
warning. 
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incorporated into a traditionally exclusive federal government intelligence community. At 
present this seems farfetched. Standing in the way is the problem that not all jurisdictions 
have a fusion center or an alternative counterterrorism intelligence capability to support 
the specific information that risk communication principles require. There is also a lack 
of standardization across the nation in the funding, mission, form, and functioning of the 
fusion centers that do exist. Even if there were comprehensive nationwide interconnected 
capability at the local level, there is no clear federal avenue for mandating such a 
responsibility, providing resource support, or ensuring that it would be uniform. To 
change this reality would require a financial and political investment so great as to seem 
unlikely. Moreover, it is doubtful that all states and localities would be willing to assume 
what could be seen as a federal government responsibility.  
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IV. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
A. WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE 
Terrorism is unlike any other hazard faced by the American public. It induces fear 
from unknown threats that lack predictability as to when, where, and how they will occur 
(Ludman, 2004). It is also the only hazard that can change based upon risk 
communication with the public (Ward, 2002). As has been shown, efforts to guide the 
public to take protective measures can lead to changes in the threat, tactics, targeting, or 
timing. The detailed and accurate information that research recommends is based upon 
natural hazards that lack the ability to interact with the information being shared. While 
specificity is equally essential in improving the probability of the public’s taking 
protective action, and thereby saving lives, it is not realistic. As previously noted, terror 
warnings are only as good as the intelligence that supports them, and detecting hidden 
plots and defeating surprise attacks will never be perfect (Squires, 2009). Again, 
information necessary to connect the dots is rarely readily available (Newhouse, 2003), 
and discreet personal communication would require technology that does not exist. These 
challenges force the realization that messengers cannot avoid imperfection in warning 
about terrorism. A perfect public message that is reliable, specific, and actionable is just 
not possible (Freedman, 2005).  
There was and still is a blurred understanding of how best to save American lives 
from terrorism and address the public’s desire to know about future terror threats and 
government efforts to prevent them. The HSAS has been the only official attempt at a 
terrorism public-warning system, and it has never aspired to be anything more than a 
bureaucratic construct partnered with the media. It has taken years to fully understand the 
unintended consequences that have negatively impacted the public and damaged future 
homeland security efforts towards efficacy in risk communication. It is a morality tale in 
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why time should have been taken to study feasibility and approach.21 Sadly, the research 
that was conducted prior to implementation was limited to other systems (Ridge, 2009).22 
It took nearly eight years for an official DHS review of the HSAS, and an act of Congress 
and change in Presidential administration was required for that. Still the HSAS remains in 
the public realm. Even after the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight #253 
from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, the airline industry is still set at code 
orange, as it has been for over three years.  
HSAS warnings from DHS, while tangible compared to local messaging, are also 
plagued by the past. The diversity and complexity of the public coupled with powers of 
personal perception make warning a tough and demanding task to begin with. Initial 
missteps and failures make warning even harder. The HSAS has achieved disappointing 
and unfortunate results. Warnings are now more likely to be tuned out and disregarded, 
thereby continuing the cycle of unintended consequences (Paul & Park, 2009). The 
HSAS has generated more jokes and laughter than protective action within its intended 
audience. The American public has been routinely exposed to images like those displayed 
in Figure 2, HSAS-related skits on late-night talk shows, and other comics. 
Derision has been the public expression of the consensus that the HSAS has failed 
in meeting its intended purpose; it signals the public’s disdain and resistance to its further 
use (Brigham, 2005). The HSAS levels establishing government policy are laughable to a  
 
 
                                                 
21 Aligning with other nation’s policies and practices did not occur in favor of a unilateral approach 
(Newhouse. 2003). This approach was contrary to research that has found terrorism to be influential in the 
political formation of coalitions and a low degree of ideological polarization within them (Indridason, 
2008).  
22 America is not the only industrialized nation that employs a terrorism warning system or issues 
terrorism threat advisories to the public. Two of America’s closest allies, the United Kingdom and Israel, 
both have extensive experience with terrorism and terrorism warnings. While not color coded, the UK 
employs threat levels similar to the HSAS. The key difference between the UK threat levels and the HSAS 
is that the intended audience is law enforcement, homeland security officials, and practitioners in 
threatened sectors as determined by intelligence (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2009). Israel’s approach 
to terrorism warnings centers on travel or specific geographical areas (Israel National Security Council, 
2009). Israeli intelligence is generally accurate enough to identify the city or part of a region that terrorists 
are targeting (Morag, 2010). As in the UK, much information is kept classified, and efforts are focused on 
prevention.  
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public that sees this color-coded chart as childish and lacking leadership. It is telling that 
the public does not believe that the HSAS makes them safer, and it is questionable 
whether changes to this system can overcome damaged public perception.  
The HSAS task force was a signal that positive change could be possible. 
Unfortunately, the task force and the report offer little hope that changes will be made 
that respect research and the scientific understanding of public communication and 
terrorism. The recommendations offered for communication with the public give a 
general impression that the authors believe that an advisory system that is truncated to 
three threat levels, may still be color coded, and that continuing to issue general warnings 
will be effective. Research suggests otherwise: there is no evidence that in the future 
detecting a plot, determining a threatened target population, and reaching it in time to 
warn of a pending attack will be anything more than science fiction. Given this, 
proceeding with the HSAS and remaining in the public realm requires discussion and 
understanding of the power of politics. Political motives are the root of the HSAS, what 
keeps it alive; they represent a challenge that lies in store for homeland security’s future 
regarding public risk communication. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Satirical Graphic Images of the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(Source: http://images.google.com) 
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B. ASPECTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
In early March 2002, the HSAS was being finalized at the White House (Brill, 
2003). The cold reality is that during that time even the creators of the color-coded idea 
knew there were going to be problems with its use in the public realm (Ridge, 2009). The 
general information that the system was going to convey did not require discussion of 
related counterterrorism intelligence (Brill, 2003). Threat assessment for implementation 
of the system amounted to personal perceptions and opinions in the aftermath of 9/11 
(Ridge, 2009). Most of the effort was invested in choosing colors and determining the 
number of levels (Brill, 2003). Even the debate over the initial color level between 
administration officials was semantic in nature (Brill, 2003).23  There was pressure to act 
and timeliness was an issue (Ridge, 2009). President Bush took an oath to protect and 
serve the public, and the 9/11 attacks occurred on his watch. Having another intelligence 
or detection failure without the public being warned was untenable (Crawford, 2004). 
Planning, procedures, quality assurance, efficiency review were all cast aside in the 
interest of quickly putting a system in place that had political value in addressing public 
suffering and questioning (Ganor, 2005). Congress was not immune from this pressure 
either. It was only twelve days after the 9/11 attacks that Congress signed the September 
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (P.L. 107-42) into law (Wolfe, 2003).24 Six 
billion dollars was allocated for a program to compensate those who were injured or the 
families of those who were killed (Wolfe, 2003). This was unprecedented legislation that 
bailed out the airline industry and addressed the wrongful deaths of the innocent victims. 
While the administration desired a different approach—tort litigation and funding from 
the U.S. Treasury—there was no disagreement as to fault and a need for victim 
compensation (Wolfe, 2003). There simply was no warning, and failed prevention was 
squarely in the hands of the federal government.  
                                                 
23 At one point, according to Tom Ridge (2009), the President himself was concerned that setting the 
system at high alert and keeping it there would render the system ineffective. 
24 The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-134) was also signed into law shortly 
after the attacks. This act exempted victims from federal income tax for the year of their death and the prior 
year. 
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Equally significant to the political pressures following 9/11 was the opportunity it 
afforded beltway politicians. Around this time, President Bush and key members of his 
administration were busy framing U.S. counterterrorism efforts as a global war in a 
different world (Crawford, 2004). The 9/11 attacks were significant enough to change the 
way that risk was assessed by the United States and how policy was crafted in response to 
the new risk (Renshon & Suedfeld, 2007). Imminent threats and asymmetrical warfare 
from stateless actors became the driving force behind the “war on terror” that spanned the 
globe. America was painted as always being under threat of attack. Fear became 
institutionalized in U.S. policy (Crawford, 2004). It became a significant part of the 
American experience, not only for the public but also for politics. Since Hobbes wrote in 
Leviathan, fear has been understood as a powerful tool in getting public support for 
agendas that claim to keep vulnerable people safe. Fear and the basic public need for 
government protection allowed for an aggressive domestic political agenda that included 
massive federal government reorganization, the formation of DHS, and the possibility for 
the Bush administration and the DHS to ready-fire-aim with the HSAS.  
The significance of fear soon became noticeable to those analyzing the support for 
the administration’s new agenda. The fear effect, as it is now known, influenced 
presidential approval ratings (Willer, 2004). When the HSAS was elevated from yellow 
to orange, approval ratings also went up (Willer, 2004). In 2005, there were already 
thirteen documented instances where a terror warning was issued within days of a 
significant political downturn for the Bush administration with the American public 
(McDermott & Zimbardo, 2006). People are known to identify with in-groups (Tajfel, 
1970) and with terrorism, anxious Americans were identifying more with the president 
and his counterterrorism efforts. Facing mortality strengthens these ties (Willer, 2004). 
Reminding people of 9/11 by raising the HSAS threat level increased solidarity with the 
president (Landau et al., 2004). Sadly, presidential approval was not the darkest of places 
that politics would take the HSAS. Research has shown that President Bush may have 
used the HSAS to ensure reelection with voters who would under full advisement have 
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otherwise voted for John Kerry (Hodler, Loertscher, & Rohner, 2007).25 Former DHS 
Director, Tom Ridge, has made statements that would support this notion (Cable News 
Network, 2009). In an interview with Fran Townsend, the former Bush Homeland 
Security Advisor and co-chair of the Homeland Security Council’s Homeland Security 
Advisory System Task Force, Tom Ridge is referred to for his confirmation that there 
was political pressure from others in the Bush administration to raise the HSAS threat 
level prior to the 2004 election (Cable News Network, 2009). While Townsend no doubt 
disagreed with Ridge’s statements considering her current work on the HSAS, she did 
confirm that there was discussion about raising the threat level in the sense that it might 
be a detriment for Bush since people could perceive it as being a political move.26  
This history demonstrates that politics are potent and fear is a powerful tool, and 
both them had an ill effect on a communication system that was intended to aid the 
public, not harm it. Fear regrettably can serve the agendas of not just terrorists but also 
those elected and sworn to protect against them. The HSAS should never have been used 
in a manner that supported political agendas or induced fear, lowering its utility to the 
level of our adversaries. Still, the propaganda following 9/11 was equal mass-media 
coverage of both the Bush administration’s HSAS elevations and Al Qaeda’s public 
addresses from Osama bin Laden (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). Possibly the 
greatest sign that any remnants of good intentions to warn the public of terrorism had 
been sacrificed occurred when President Bush himself, after his reelection, credited 
Osama bin Laden with helping him retain office (Nacos Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). 
The restraint that President Bush asked of the media in airing bin Laden statements soon 
after 9/11 were not requested around election time. Fear of terrorism, again, proved 
                                                 
25 The research was inspired by the 2004 reelection of President George W. Bush and the HSAS 
elevated threat level that lasted from August 1, 2004, until November 10, 2004. The research intent was to 
determine whether or not an incumbent could benefit during reelection by issuing distorted terror alerts 
with rational voters who are aware of the incumbent’s incentive and potential to do this. The research 
showed that it is possible for an incumbent to use terror alerts to manipulate votes for reelection from 
voters who believe the opposing candidate is better. Related research found that there were significant 
effects on voting in 2004 from the war on terror and the Iraq war that ultimately favored the incumbent, 
Bush (Hillygus & Shields, 2005). The researchers found these two issues hard to differentiate since the 
Bush campaign linked these together, known as Bush Doctrine (Renshon & Suedfeld, 2007). 
26 The Hodler, Loertscher, & Rohner research shows that voter awareness of possible political 
motivation does not inhibit them from being manipulated into voting against their presuppositions for an 
incumbent. 
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valuable. The HSAS was wrapped into politics in a way that perverted fear management 
and life-saving efforts. This regrettably has come at the expense of the American public 
that it was intended to serve.27 
                                                 
27 Social and economic impacts have also been found:research has concluded that public fear from 

















A. RESISTING POLITICAL PRESSURE: DISBANDING THE HSAS 
This system has clearly evolved over time to be used primarily for 
political ideology, and contains no effective psychological, practical, or 
even political efficacy. 
— Philip G. Zimbardo 
President Bush used HSPD-3 and 5 to make it clear that the HSAS was supposed 
to be an effective way to communicate the risk of terror attacks to the American public. 
However, what these presidential directives did not do is detail how the HSAS was to 
distinguish between this audience and government stakeholders. The nature and scale of 
the 9/11 terror attacks created a political climate that blurred the lines between addressing 
the fears and safety of the American public and sharing vital counterterrorism intelligence 
with government stakeholders. Yigal Pressler, former advisor to the Israeli Prime 
Minister on counterterrorism, once stated that most decisions are made immediately 
following an attack, only to find difficulty months later when they are tested with reality 
(Ganor, 2005). The reality test for the HSAS is that ultimately no authority invested in 
prevention is ever going to aid an adversary, hidden within the general population, with 
specific intelligence.  
What is left for HSAS warnings is pursuing ambiguity or no public warning at all. 
Debate on these options is encouraged and believed to be again necessary and 
worthwhile. It is unfortunate that the HSAS Task Force Report and Recommendations 
was not the vehicle for this. The report’s recommendations, specific to the general public, 
keep the HSAS as a public communication tool. Doing so will have to contend with the 
past and how the public’s perception has been shaped. Changing the HSAS will face the 
significant challenge of gaining and regaining the public ear. The people and society in 
general have not looked favorably on the HSAS. Generalized warnings and published 
criticisms of the HSAS have had a negative impact on people’s understanding of the 
HSAS, on the level of trust in the system, and on its effectiveness in directing public 
action. For a leader to proceed with this in mind and an understanding of trust 
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relationships is counterproductive. Damaged credibility, such as what is presently at hand 
with the HSAS, impedes messenger effectiveness. Warnings can fall flat in these 
instances and opportunities to influence the threatened public into taking protective 
action can be lost.  
Resigning ourselves to providing simplified overviews of threat environment will 
sustain a system that manufactures unintended consequences. These problems have 
locked the HSAS in a holding pattern that has lasted since 2006, making it increasingly 
irrelevant. Considering these problems, the notion of no communication should be 
understood as closing this chapter of America’s homeland security history. When 
considering whether or not it is politically tenable for the president and the DHS to not 
issue terrorism threat advisories to the American public, it is important to understand that, 
even during the time that the HSAS was created and established, there were individuals 
within the Bush administration and the DHS who believed that terror warnings should be 
outside of the public realm (Fenzel, 2008). The argument for this approach placed 
prevention of a terrorist attack over warning the public. Counterterrorism intelligence for 
this end would be controlled and limited in distribution to only those with a need to know 
and who are stakeholders in interdicting the terrorists and disrupting their plot. It is time 
to return to government’s responsibilities to protect its people. Saving a life from 
terrorism is done best by making sure that a warning is not necessary. Terrorism 
prevention must be the priority and means for doing that.  
Consistency with a flawed approach is simply perpetuation of a problematic 
system that has been bastardized by politics and become stigmatized and marginalized. 
The intrinsic qualities of a terror warning which could help save lives has never been 
achieved because of this flawed approach and never will. The HSAS should be retired 
and its communication process disbanded and reorganized in a manner that excludes the 
public. As world-renowned psychologist and researcher Dr. Philip Zimbardo (2009) 
states, “The terror alert system as practiced in the United States is less than worthless, 
and needs to be thoroughly revised. That revision must be based on our understanding of 
effective emergency warning systems and the psychological analysis of how best to 
motivate citizens for impending dangers facing them.”  
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The concept of terrorism threat advisories should be removed from the public 
realm entirely. Advisories should remain a private prevention-based homeland security 
function. The American public does not need to be intimately involved in the intelligence 
community to the detriment of prevention efforts and the public’s psychological well-
being. Any perceived political necessity to provide terrorism threat advisories to the 
public can be satisfied with controlled and limited distribution within law enforcement 
and the intelligence community. There simply is no better news than that of a prevented 
attack. This positive result of counterterrorism is the righteous way to pursue public 
approval and political ambitions. 
B. A NEW DIRECTION 
Terrorism is about one thing: Psychology. It is the psychology of fear. 
— Philip G. Zimbardo 
Recommending policy that would terminate the HSAS is done with the 
understanding that history is known for repeating itself. It is unrealistic to consider 
prevention perfected, and closure for the HSAS should not be considered a portrayal of 
an American future that is free from terror attacks. The significantly heavy burden placed 
on counterterrorism intelligence and the intelligence community (IC) to defeat surprise 
and prevent terrorism is no less today than it was when the HSAS was created. Future 
attacks on American soil must be factored into the development of new homeland 
security policy regarding public terrorism risk communication. Efforts thus far with the 
HSAS have not immunized Americans from the perils of politics or the psychology of 
terrorism. America is not cultured to understand that prevention is not absolute, and 
people are prone to losing sight of the threat of terrorism when not educated. A 2009 
Gallup Poll (Morales, 2009) showed a decline in American’s level of concern for 
terrorism. Only one percent listed terrorism as the most important problem that America 
faces and 73 percent claimed a fair or great deal of confidence in the U.S. government’s 
ability to protect citizens from future terrorist attacks. At the same time, other research 
has shown that only one in three Americans trusts government warnings, and three 
quarters of Americans do not believe that government has explained how to prepare for 
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terrorism (Breckenridge, 2009). While just a snapshot in time, these figures are 
representative of the possible public perceptions that U.S. policy could face when another 
successful attack occurs on U.S. soil, killing Americans. Prevention is not absolute, and 
the public should be concerned and encouraged to participate and prepare for the realistic 
eventuality of future attacks. Avoiding the same significant problems in politics and 
public accountability that came with 9/11 should be the focus of policy development. 
The impacts of the 9/11 attacks are rightfully enormous. They continue to demand 
that government communicate with the public regarding terrorism and to improve on the 
public service that has been provided thus far. However, the time is right for this to 
happen in a manner that is consistent with research-based understandings of psychosocial 
science that have bearing on our success in reaching the threatened public and achieving 
the recommended response. To right past wrongs, we must pause to understand the social 
psychology implications of what we are trying to achieve (Zimbardo & Kluger, 2003; 
Bongar, 2007). The scientific pioneers who separated the psychology of terrorism risk 
communication from other hazards through mental health research, continued 
questioning, and testing have moved our understandings into an established field of study 
(Flynn, 2004; Bongar, 2007). Because of this, we should never again ignore how the 
psychology of fear impacts the interconnections between government, the public, and 
terrorists when we try to warn. The time is right for government to begin taking the terror 
out of terrorism through fear management education that addresses the psychological 
underpinnings of public perception and action (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). Simply 
improving HSAS advisories and clarifying citizen guidance about a revision to the 
system will not be sufficient to restore public trust and confidence in government 
homeland security efforts (Breckenridge, 2009). A new approach is now necessary. 
Research data still shows a public that lacks confidence that homeland security 
professionals and government will be open and tell the truth (Breckenridge, 2009). 
Overcoming this requires public education on the issue of terrorism and outreach for 
hazard-specific preparedness (Ganor, 2005). Engaging the public in efforts to be 
informed and active in countering terrorism and protecting themselves and others is key 
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to our future homeland security efforts (Zimbardo, 2009). Giving the public strength from 
understanding and knowledge will help combat fear and distrust.  
Efforts toward establishing new policy should be encouraged, noting examples 
from other nations, such as Israel. Israel is one example of a national approach being 
directed at removing the psychology of fear from terrorism. (Homeland Security Institute, 
2009). Founded on a civil defense law from 1951, Israelis are cultured to prepare for 
threats of terrorism and successful attacks (Israeli Home Front Command, 2010). 
Preparedness begins with education from kindergarten to completion of the twelfth grade 
(Homeland Security Institute, 2009). In conjunction with the Ministry of Education, 
classes continually expose children and young adults to the reality of the threat and how 
to cope (Israeli Home Front Command, 2010). Education is also supported by an annual 
national drill required for all of Israel’s educational institutions (Israeli Home Front 
Command, 2010). These measures are indicative of a more frequent exposure to terrorist 
attacks than is the United States at present. However, with an unknown future, this 
example can serve as a starting point for valuable further research. Sound and just 
approaches to public service and risk communication will be better obtained before the 
threat environment in the United States changes.  
Fortunately, post-9/11 preparedness initiatives afford policy makers a place to 
start. Public outreach continues to be a priority, and DHS has even published guidelines 
for this practice (DHS, 2007b). Initiatives such as Citizen Corps have led to valuable 
research findings to help understand why people do not prepare and to recommend 
education for changing behavior (DHS, 2006).28 Add to this the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (DHS, 2007c), which encourages personal responsibility for 
surviving an attack and providing for basic needs in the aftermath, and it becomes more 
apparent that it is possible for policy to grow towards future social conditioning that 
                                                 
28 The Citizen Corp Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness (DHS, 2006) asserts 
that individuals decide not to prepare for disasters because they do not perceive a threat or susceptibility to 
a threat, or they perceive a threat or susceptibility but perceive barriers to preparedness activities. The 
model also recommends community outreach through a risk-based preparedness program that would 
provide educational messages about the threats, personal vulnerability, and related preparedness activities 
and mitigation measures. The model recommends that this be followed by efficacy messaging and behavior 
maintenance and reinforcement. 
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better aids people to endure terrorism (Ripley, 2008). Research has shown that readiness 
and willingness to comply with government directions for protective action is greater 
with citizens who view their role as a duty (Breckenridge, 2009). Education towards duty 
and involvement is much more substantial than websites, volunteer programs, and 
periodic training courses. In order to help a public that has been shown to have a strong 
desire for involvement in its own defense but feels that the government has not done 
enough for public participation, we must do more to listen to the opinions of the public 
and to provide them with opportunities to contribute (Breckenridge, 2009).29  Only 
through partnership with the public that affords it opportunities to participate will we be 
able to reach a point where the public is confident that homeland security is competent 
and trustworthy (Breckenridge, 2009).  
Helpful and relevant information must be woven into school curricula, and 
knowledge must be cultivated in the public through innovative ways of preparing for 
terrorism similar to other mental and physical health practices. Transformation will be 
defined by leaders who want to be agents for a necessary change process that moves U.S. 
policy beyond the HSAS concept. To be a more resilient nation, capable of better 
withstanding the aims of terrorists and misaligned political ambitions, policy must guide 
the United States to a healthier and more realistic education strategy.30 Planning 
strategically to better achieve what the HSAS has not can be an effective way to solve 
problems and rebuild public trust (Bach, 2010). The HSAS is an already-written story. 
The sequel should be the narrative explaining how the American public will be told who 
might attack and how, what can be done to help prevent an attack, and what to do after an 
attack because there is a probability of such an occurrence (Ripley, 2008). Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, once stated that terrorism education in school 
curricula can assist government in creating a citizenry that can live with terrorism and not 
                                                 
29 The American Perceptions Study is a national study of 4,000 American adults that began in 
November 2008 (Breckenridge, 2009). 
30 U.S. military information operations, as highlighted in past Quadrennial Defense Review Reports, 
have been recommended for enhancement through education of information operations forces in 
psychology and sociology. Success for this mission area has been argued to be possible, in part, through a 
complete change in culture, altering foundational beliefs about educational understanding of the sciences 
relating to information operations (Durkin et al., 2007). 
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succumb to its aims (Ganor, 2005). Trusting government is the foundation for public risk 
communication (Ripley, 2008), and in the case of terrorism in America, this should be 
developed and sustained from public education. A strong and resilient public makes for a 
better American future. 
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